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IV.

INTRODUCTION: THE IMPENDING DEMOGRAPHIC TIPPING POINT

The prospect of death, they say, focuses the mind remarkably.
Might other great changes do the same? As America approaches the
point when minorities will begin to outnumber whites (estimated to
happen sometime in the middle of this century),' writers and columnists have begun writing about what that event portends. Thus, recent
books have emerged on the browning of America,2 on panethnicity, 3
on the need to preserve precious white genes and culture,4 and on
5
whether America is still the greatest country in the world.
Also recently, articles and books have appeared on the prospect
that minority groups will form alliances, possibly with disaffected
working-class whites, and translate their impending majority into political and cultural influence. 6 Without such coalitions, these authors
seem to suggest, 2050-the year of the predicted demographic tipping point-might come and go without noticeable effect. Well past
that point, Euro-Americans will continue to be the single richest and
largest racial group in the country. If minorities do not unite to challenge the white establishment, they are destined to remain poor and
7
politically marginalized.
Two recent books illustrate this preoccupation with interracial coalition. Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres's book, The Miner's Canary:
EnlistingRace, ResistingPower, TransformingDemocracy, forcefully argues
that minorities should unite, beginning with local issues, in pursuit of
social justice.8 Eric Yamamoto's book, InterracialJustice: Conflict and
Reconciliation in Post-Civil Rights America, outlines a program for mi-

I

On this impending "tipping point," see Orlando Patterson, Race by the Numbers, N.Y.

TIMES, May 8, 2001, at A27.
2 RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, BROWN: THE LAST DISCOVERY OF AMERICA (2002).
YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICITY (1992). Panethnicity is the idea
that heterogeneous groups such as Asians and Latinos might begin seeing themselves as
single blocs. See id. at 2.
4 PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST (2002).
5 WILLIAM J. BENNETT, WHY WE FIGHT: MORAL CLARITY AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

So GREAT ABOUT AMERICA (2002).
6 For a compilation of examples of these articles and books, see JUAN PEREA ET AL.,
RACE AND RACES 1104-18 (2000).
(2002); DINESH D'SouzX, WHAT'S

7

See Manning Marable, Beyond Racial Identity Politics: Towards a Liberation Theory for

Multicultural Democracy, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE 448 (Richard Del-

gado &Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000).
8 See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 10, 17, 30, 54-55, 69-70, 131-222 (2002).
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norities to bury their grievances and work together toward essentially
the same ends. 9 The two books differ greatly in their organization,
style, and scope. For example, one is elegant, even overwrought,
while the other is lucid and terse. But they share the faith that
America's hope lies with a heady coalition of the dispossessed.10 They
argue that outsider scholars and communities, because of the legacy
of oppression, enjoy a deeper, sharper sense of social justice than the
more complacent majority." Accordingly, if blacks, Latinos, Asians,
Native Americans, and down-and-out whites join forces, not only they
12
but also the country as a whole will benefit.
Part I of this Review briefly describes and compares the GuinierTorres and Yamamoto books, noting their strengths and weaknesses.
Part II explores the logic of coalition making. Part III shows that
when race is an element, coalition making becomes more, not less,
problematic. Part IV examines the historical record of interminority
coalitions. The Conclusion urges reformers to replace the procedural
objective of coalition with the substantive goal of social justice and to
work to realize that goal both individually and collectively. The hope
for a great union of dispossessed people standing shoulder to shoulder is, ultimately, an evasion, motivated by the unspoken desire to let
someone else do the hard work. The "differential racialization" hypothesis posits that racial harms will vary from group to group and
over time. 13 It logically follows, therefore, that redress for those
harms will take culturally specific forms so that the collective dimension of struggle will very often take second place to the individual one.
I
Two

RECENT

BOOKS

ABOUT INTERRACIAL GROUPS

AND POLITICS

Although spurred by the same hope that minorities may, one day,
join forces in a powerful movement for social reform, the two books
9

See

ERIC K.

YAMAMOTO,

INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND

RECONCILIATION

IN

POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 15, 48-49, 210-76 (1999).
10
See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 10-12, 30-31; YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at

9-14.
1I

See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 86-89, 168-73; YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at

133-38.
12
See GuINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 10-11, 30, 96-98; YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at
7, 276 (observing that exploring race relations "implicates broader concerns for all in multiracial America" and is important for the country as a whole).
13

See generally TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES 25-26 (1994)

(discussing how

the racialization process historically has been influenced by the social positions of immigrants); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55-61
(2d ed. 1994) (discussing racial formation and the role of historically situated projects);
PEREA ET AL., supra note 6, at 1-4 (introducing the book's discussion of the particular
histories of the major racial groups in the United States and commenting that "history
enables comparisons among the experiences of these different racialized groups").
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exhibit a number of sharp differences. For example, the Yamamoto
book centers on what must be done to prepare the way for successful
coalitions.' 4 The Guinier-Torres book, however, focuses on how minority discontent can be harnessed to achieve reforms that will benefit
society as a whole. 15 Despite their differences, both books emphasize
those qualities that all minorities supposedly have in common: grievance, energy, and superior moral and cultural wisdom born of the
legacy of oppression.' 6 Further, the authors of both books believe
that the time is right for coalition. Any earlier, and the requisite numbers would have been lacking; years from now, the magic moment
might have passed. 17 In addition, each book offers a sort of one-twothree prescription, reminiscent of a host of self-help books, for converting their hopes into reality.' 8 Finally, both books place great faith
in the power of coalitions to effect change. Yamamoto, for example,
writes that his approach "offers racial groups a ... [means of] dealing
with collective memory while moving toward a more peaceable, productive future."' 9 Guinier and Torres posit that "[c]ombining race
and gender with collaborative forms of power may yield the most
transformative model of all."' 20 Before setting forth my criticism, it is
necessary to take a closer look at these two books.
A.

Eric Yamamoto, InterracialJustice

How can groups settle interracial grievances and form vibrant coalitions for social justice? Eric Yamamoto, professor of law at the University of Hawaii, examines a series of case studies, including the
recent disturbances in South Central Los Angeles, 2 1 a San Francisco
school board suit that pitted Asians against Latinos and blacks for slots
at prestigious Lowell High School, 22 a dispute among Latinos, Asians,
and blacks over minority contracting in Oakland, California, 23 and a
feud between a Korean hat shop owner and inner-city blacks. 24 Yama25
moto also discusses reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa
and a controversy in Hawaii in which Asian Americans pondered an
apology and reparations for their part in ousting Native Hawaiians
See YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at 1, 7-9.
See GuINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 17.
16 See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 10-18, 34, 74-82, 86-89, 105-07; YAMAMOTO,
supra note 9, at 8-10, 13, 15-16.
17
See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 10, 30-34; YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at 7-9.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 32-35, 72-74.
19 YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at 12.
20
GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 163.
14
15

21

See YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at 8.

22
23
24
25

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

at
at
at
at

27, 29-33, 42.
27-28.
13, 152, 179, 236-40, 242-53.
254-75.
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from their ancestral lands. 26 He examines interracial relations in local elections, 2 7 state referenda,2 8 university governance, 29 and the
courts, 30 all in a search for forces that impair or promote cooperation
among outgroups seeking justice from the white establishment. He
shows how stock stories, such as those about the lazy, welfare-loving
black, the suspicious, grasping Asian shop-owner, or the coat-tail rid31
ing Latino, can stand in the way of cooperation.
By analyzing cases in which coalitions succeeded as well as ones in
which they did not, Yamamoto offers a four-step framework for successful interminority coalition building. First, groups must recognize
each other's history and feelings, including any grievances they bring
to the table. 3 2 Next, they must take responsibility for their own part in
oppressing their neighbor. 33 Subsequently, they must reconstruct and
heal the relationship, usually through atonement and apology. 34 Finally, they must make reparationfor the harms done.3 5 Injustifying his
approach, Yamamoto draws on a variety of sources: social psychology, 3 6 theology, 37 political 38 and narrative theory, 39 history, 40 and in41
digenous healing ceremonies and practices.
Yamamoto discusses a number of cases from around the world
that illustrate problems common to reconciliation. For example, the
chapter on South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission illustrates what can happen when parties to a proceeding pursue different
agendas. 42 Nelson Mandela established the commission to investigate
human rights violations and "consider amnesty for those who confess
43
to political crimes ... [and] to recommend reparations to victims.
Many of the witnesses who appeared before Pieter Botha's commission admitted their guilt only half-heartedly. 44 More interested in se26
27

See id. at 60-78.
See id. at 25, 28.
28
See id. at 26, 28.
29
See id.
30
See id. at 27-28.
31
See id. at 3-4, 25-29, 122, 179-84, 243-50.
32
See id. at 10, 175-85 (referred to as "Recognition").
33
See id. at 10-11, 185-90 (referred to as "Responsibility").
34
See id. at 11, 190-203 (referred to as "Reconstruction").
35
See id. at 11, 203-09 (referred to as "Reparation").
36
See id. at 162-64.
37
See id. at 159-62.
38 See id. at 164-66.
39 See id. at 243-49.
40
See, e.g., id. at 60-78 (discussing the history of apology and redress of Asian Americans and Native Americans).
41
See id. at 166-67.
42
See id. at 254-75.
43
Id. at 255.
44
See, e.g., id. at 265-67 (discussing the confessions of five former policemen who
murdered a black antiapartheid activist).
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curing amnesty than making amends, they offered slanted, one-sided
accounts of their own acts and made little effort to understand or
make amends for the damage they inflicted on their victims. 4 5 Yama-

moto's discussion of the reconciliation between mainstream churches
and native Hawaiians shows how a group that has gained a position of
dominance through the exploitation of others may attempt to avoid
responsibility by blaming a larger and more powerful impersonal entity, such as the U.S. government. 46 Finally, Yamamoto's discussion of
a disagreement between a Vietnamese grocer family and black residents of a New Orleans neighborhood shows how two mediations
and a prayer service foundered when the parties persisted in seeing
47
each other in stereotypical terms.
Relations among outgroups, for Yamamoto, are fraught with pitfalls, requiring effort, skill, knowledge, and the willingness to expose
one's vulnerabilities and past transgressions. The minority community exhibits deep divisions, adding a new dimension to the critique of
racial essentialism. A successful coalition does not just magically appear because two minority groups seek a similar concession from
whites.
B.

Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, The Miner's Canary

Except in Guinier and Torres's perspective. Their elegant, slick
book, based on the Nathan I. Huggins Lectures, is everything Yamamoto's is not. Guinier and Torres begin with the observation that
blacks have developed a unique perspective on the American system
and on racial justice. 48 This double consciousness uniquely equips
them to lead interracial coalitions aimed at advancing the cause of all
minorities. 49 Although many working-class whites suffer from some of
the same workplace hazards and elitist university admissions criteria
that haunt minorities, 50 a coalition led by blacks, with Latinos (whom
they persist in calling Hispanics) falling into line, can pick up needed
allies among down-and-out whites, women, and sexual minorities. 5 1
Guinier and Torres list a number of examples of successful interracial coalition building, neglecting to discuss, as Yamamoto does, the
many instances in which it failed. For them, "political race," their neologism for a coalition of outgroups, is a mighty engine for social re45

See
See
47
See
48
See
49
See
ing text.
46

50

See

id. at 260-67.
id. at 62-63, 66-67, 214.
id. at 1-6.
GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 17, 79, 86-89, 101, 122.
id. at 17, 30-31, 69-70, 94-95, 105, 294; infra notes 53, 77-79 and accompanyGUINIER

&

TORRES,

supra note 8, at 20-21, 30-31, 67-68, 96, 118-19, 133.

See id. at 17, 30-31, 69-70, 94-95, 105, 294; infra notes 53, 77-79 and accompanying text (describing the role Guinier and Torres set out for Latinos).
51
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form. 52 They argue that reviled minorities-or, at any rate, blacks-

alone have the energy, motivation, and cohesion to mount effective
resistance to oppressive programs operated by the complacent majority.53 Although Guinier and Torres do pay lip service to the need to

move beyond the black/white binary paradigm of race, it is clear that
blacks are to occupy the center of the new political-race coalitions
with others, such as Latinos and Asians, falling into line. 5 4 Will they,

and if so, for how long? Evidently, the authors have not consulted
Yamamoto, or they would display greater caution in assuming interra55
cial solidarity behind the leadership of any one group.
Not only will the other minority groups-presumably including
what is now the largest group, Latinos-benefit from lining up behind
African Americans, Guinier and Torres argue, white America will as
well. Like the canary that miners carried to detect poisonous gas
before the invention of machines, all of society can benefit by noticing when blacks are suffering. 56 The black community's failure to
thrive can signal conditions that require attention before they spread
to society at large. 57 Harry Kalven, Jr.'s The Negro and the First Amendment urged a similar position, pointing out that society has blacks to
thank for the creation of a great deal of free speech law. 58 Kalven,

however, like Yamamoto, is absent from the pages of The Miner's Canary, whose authors, like teenagers discovering sex, appear to think
that they have thought of the idea first. But they also believe in "Magical Realism," 59 so anything, perhaps, is possible, including co-opting
an idea without citation.
Chapters 1 and 2 lay out, in rhapsodic language and with many
big words, 60 the core ideas mentioned above. Chapter 3 mentions the
61
"Texas 10 Percent Plan" as an example of political race in operation.
In the wake of Hopwood v. Texas, in which the Fifth Circuit prohibited
52
53
54
group
it also
55
56

See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 11-31.
See id. at 17-18, 86-89.
See id. at 13-14, 17, 19, 82, 227, 288-90. Guinier and Torres assert that "[r]acial
consciousness not only makes blacks more politically active and effective as a group;
helps make individual blacks more psychologically resilient." Id. at 82.
See supra notes 21-31, 44-47 and accompanying text.
See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 11-12, 14, 20, 25, 31, 57-58, 99, 128-29,

171-72, 275.
57 See id. at 11-12.
58

HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 3-4 (1965).

59

See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 22-23.

60

For example, Guinier and Torres write that they "explore a post-postnodern idea

of power that highlights human agency within relationships that narrate rather than simply
observe change. By narrate we mean an active process of creating a story that is both
explanatory and motivational, as opposed to merely descriptive." GUINIER & TORRES, supra
note 8, at 18.
61
See id. at 67-107.
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consideration of race in public university admissions, 62 Texas minorities succeeded in enacting legislation that reformed admissions criteria in state universities. 63 Under the new plan, the top ten percent of
high school graduates in the state of Texas are guaranteed admission
64
to the state's university system without regard to their SAT scores.
This shift benefited graduates of heavily Latino districts in the southern part of the state, as well as blacks in such large Texas cities as
65
Houston and Dallas.
Guinier and Torres are particularly pleased with the 10 Percent
Plan because it also stood to benefit working-class whites, a few of
whom are said to have supported it.66 Certain features of the Plan
should have troubled Guinier and Torres, however. First, the initiative was the brainchild of two Latino legislators; 67 it did not originate
with black leadership, and so is, strictly speaking, a counterexample of
political race as outlined by Guinier and Torres. In addition, the authors do not mention how long the interracial coalition lasted and
what other goals they pursued. For example, have the newly favored
working-class whites marched arm-in-arm with minorities demonstrating for expanded ethnic studies departments? By the same token, the
Texas 10 Percent Plan has done little to integrate the state's professional schools, such as the law school at Austin, 68 where one of the
authors teaches. 69 Have working-class whites, admitted under the new
rules, agitated for increased diversity in those elite schools? This reviewer certainly has seen little evidence of it. Indeed, it should not be
long before poor whites in Texas realize that a class/disadvantagebased plan, like that advocated by Richard Kahlenberg in his book,
The Remedy, 70 will benefit them even more, without the need to make
71
common cause with all those hard-to-please minorities.
62
63

78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996).
H.B. 588, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 304; Mary Ann Roser, Top

10% College Admission Law Yields Mixed Results, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 28, 1998, at Al;

see also GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 68-69 (describing the role of legislators Irma
Rangel and Gonzalo Barrientos and academic David Montejano in enacting the legislation
establishing the Texas 10 Percent Plan).
64
65

H.B. 588.
See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 73, 251.

66
67

See id. at 71-74.
See id. at 68-69.

68

See Linda K. Wertheimer, Grad Schools Put to the Test, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb.

25, 2002, at IA.
69 Gerald Torres is professor of law at University of Texas at Austin. See ASS'N oF AM.
LAW SCHS., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 2000-2001, at 1053 (2000).
70
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY. CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(1996) (proposing that race-based affirmative action be replaced with a class- or disadvantage-based version).
71
This is so because the number of poor whites greatly exceeds that of poor blacks
and Latinos. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS & U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY (MARCH SUPP.), TABLE 1: AGE, SEX, HOUSEHOLD RELATIONSHIP, RACE AND
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Like Yamamoto, Guinier and Torres offer a step-by-step framework for successful interminority coalition building, but unlike Yamamoto's, their framework is extremely abstract: reconceptualize metanarratives, 72 work from the ground up, 73 and tackle hierarchy.74 They

do, however, provide a special, honored role for women. Women are
said to be good in heterogeneous, fragmented communities. 7 5 They

help everyone feel good, stay together, and focus on "power with," not
"power over."' 76
Chapter 7 on Latinos reminds the reader of the unique black history of suffering and moral entitlement. 77 But, Guinier and Torres

point out, Latinos can help out, too. The key is where a given Latino
places himself along the black/white binary continuum. 78 White-looking Latinos are a lost cause, whereas darker-skinned Latinos are apt to
80
be more reform-minded. 79 Portions of chapters 6 and 7 on elections
recycle many of Guinier's previous ideas about voting reforms, such as
cumulative voting, but with a difference. 8 1 Backtracking slightly,
Guinier and Torres now urge that elections cannot be a political-race

coalition's main focus. 8 2 One has to start small, with unionizing a
83
plant or electing friendly school board officials, for example.

HISPANIC

ORIGIN-POVERTrY

STATUS

OF PEOPLE

BY SELECTED

CHARACTERISTICS

IN

2001

(2002), at http://ferret.bls. census.gov/macro/032002/pov/new0O_001.htm (last modified Sept. 23, 2002). By contrast, because of Texas's high degree of housing and school
segregation, see U.S. Assumes Administrationof Texas City's Housing Office, DESERET NEWS, Oct.
4, 2000, at A5; Ben Wear, Separate and Still Not Equal, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 12, 2001,

at Al, the Texas 10 Percent Place will disproportionately benefit minorities (which, of
course, was the reason for its adoption).
72

GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 137. For a slightly different list, see id. at 95-96.

73
74
75

See id. at 137.
See id. at 137-38.
See id. at 161-63, 166-67.

76

See id. But see RACHEL SIMMONS, ODD GIRL OUT (2002) (questioning the myth of the

sweet, cooperative girl); ROSALIND WISEMAN, QUEEN BEES AND WANNABES (2002) (same).
77
See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 86, 135, 226-27. As Guinier and Torres

state, "Thus far we have tried to show ... that those who have been raced black in our
society are more likely than others to develop an oppositional, collective consciousness
and ... become more resilient in the face of racism." Id.,at 86; see also supra notes 53-54
and accompanying text (describing Guinier and Torres's understanding of the black community's leading role in the pursuit of social change).
78
See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 223-32.
79
See id. at 229-32.
80 See id. at 168-222, 232-35.
81 For a summary of Guinier's works on voting rights and strategies to increase minority representation, see LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994).
82 See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 245; see also id. at 14-15, 208 (observing that
"it is necessary to move from the primacy of individual status to a focus on group interactions and their relationship with power," but also that the authors "do not... mean either
exclusively or primarily those activities associated with electoral politics").
83
See id. at 246-48; see also id. at 131-222 (discussing the search for "open spaces" in
which minority coalitions might seize the opportunity to press for reforms).
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Chapter 8 uses the war on drugs as an example of another instance in which minorities serve as the miner's canary.8 4 A program
that falls heavily on minorities is now beginning to harm society at
large. How? Guinier and Torres point to the high cost of incarceration and prison construction, which is beginning to divert money that
whites might prefer to see spent in other ways. 8 5 Cutting back on the
unconscionably high incarceration rate of men and women of color is
certainly desirable and would save money. But would the savings go to
building new recreation centers for blue-collar children or even zoos
for upper-class white children, rather than to building military hardware or providing corporate welfare? Working-class whites are not politically unsophisticated. Many might even ask themselves questions
like these. Besides, whiteness has a property value,8

6

so preserving a

black underclass enhances the position of poor whites who are able to
tell themselves that they are at least better off, materially and psychi87
cally, than blacks.
Merely seeing connections among things is not enough. If racism
benefits the dominant group, feel-good formulas, talking, and chants
of solidarity may need to be forever supplemented by outright disruption and resistance. Political race may well enhance democracy.88 But
opportunities for coalition making may be fewer in number and less
easily achieved than Guinier and Torres think. Oppression may turn
out to be purposive, not accidental, instituted to disadvantage exactly
those who reside at the bottom of society. The miners did, after all,
cage the canaries and haul them down into the mines.
C.

Discussion

Both books are, in their own way, excellent. Yamamoto's book is
better written, features more examples, and is less Panglossian than
the Guinier-Torres text. Guinier and Torres, however, do offer one
outstanding, breakthrough idea-that social justice depends on the
energy and initiative of dissatisfied groups (in most cases, minorities),
and that coalitions for change must begin with these groups and radiate outward.89 Yamamoto's book is especially valuable in emphasizing
that racial analysis must expand beyond the black/white binary paradigm, in which race was once synonymous with blacks and progressivism meant sympathetic white folks getting together to help African
Americans.
See id. at 262-67, 274-77, 280.
See id. at 267, 274-78 (citing budgetary demands imposed by the war on drugs that
minorities and whites might not like).
86
See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
87
See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 205-09 (4th ed. 2000).
88 See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 104-05.
89 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
84
85
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Nevertheless, both books overlook Derrick Bell's great materialist
insight9" and make the mistake of assuming that minority misery is
unnatural and certain to be corrected once pointed out to those in
power. The canary may be sick for a reason; as I once pointed out, the
optimal rate of racism may not be zero. 9' A more appropriate image
than the miner's canary may be that of the soundproofed stockyards
with neighbors who cannot hear the bellows and cries of animals being slaughtered. Minorities, then, may be the opposite of canariestheir role may be precisely to suffer and be quiet. If the canary looks
healthy, then it is time to pile on the pressure.
Neither book does a particularly good job in tracing its own intellectual lineage: Elizabeth Martfnez, 92 Juan Perea,9 3 Frank Wu, 9 4 and
Robert Chang 9 5 earlier called attention to the straitjacket of the
black/white binary. Bernice Reagon9 6 and Robert Chang 97 analyzed
interracial coalition. Yet, none of these writers receives the recognition he or she deserves.
In addition, none of the authors demonstrates more than a basic
awareness of the demographic forces that impel their own work or of
the many manifestations of cultural paranoia98 that the impending
non-white majority is beginning to inspire. To name just a few, the
majority is militarizing our borders; 99 enacting anti-immigrant measures such as California's Proposition 187 and English-only laws in over
half the states; 0 0° sealing off college opportunities for students of
90

See Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma,

93 HAv. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980) (pointing out that civil rights advances for blacks
come about only when white self-interest so dictates).
91 See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision,
85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 386 & n.351 (1991).
92 Elizabeth Martfnez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our Time, 20 Soc. JusT. 22
(1993).
93 Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1213 (1997).
94 Frank H. Wu, Neither Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 225 (1995).
95 Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory,
Post-Structuralism,and Narrative Space, 81 CAL: L. REv. 1243 (1993).
96 Bernice Johnson Reagon, Coalition Politics: Turning the Century, in HOME GIRLS: A
BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY 356 (Barbara Smith ed., 1983).
97

ROBERT S. CHANG,

DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS,

LAw, AND THE NATION-STATE

128-29 (1999); Chang, supra note 95.
98 See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 4, at 3 ("Uncontrolled immigration threatens to
deconstruct the nation we grew up in and convert America into a conglomeration of peoples with almost nothing in common-not history, heroes, language, culture, faith, or
ancestors.").
99

See TIMOTHYJ. DUNN, THE MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER, 1978-1992

(1996); Patrisia Gonzales & Roberto Rodriguez, Two Wars Against Immigrants, DENVER POST,
Feb. 13, 2000, at 3G.
100

See JEAN STEFANCIC & RiCRARD DELGADO, No MERCY 20-32 (1996).

Proposition

187's key provisions prohibit illegal immigrants from attending public schools or receiving
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color by limiting affirmative action and race-based scholarships;°10 intensifying the wars on loitering and gang membership, all of which
leads to the incarceration of large numbers of minority youth; 10 2 and
increasingly electing conservative officials and judges in hopes of staving off social change.10 3
The Guinier-Torres book contemplates a much greater role for
whites in the civil rights coalition than Yamamoto's book. 0 4 Yamamoto is mainly concerned with paving the way for coalitions among
outgroups of color; only in one or two passages does he hold out hope
for engaging whites.10 5 Guinier and Torres, however, are especially
optimistic about enlisting dissatisfied working-class whites, along with
blacks and Latinos, to press for economic reforms.1 0 6 Nevertheless,
Guinier and Torres may be faulted for overlooking Derrick Bell's insight that working-class whites are unlikely to side with blacks, even
though whites face many of the same obstacles, because of an implicit
10 7
property interest in whiteness.
Yamamoto looks further into the ability of minorities to serve as
sources of wisdom than do Guinier and Torres. For Yamamoto, an
outgroup may simultaneously oppress another and be victimized by a
third.108 For Guinier and Torres, minorities are apt to perceive injustice more acutely than others and to appreciate the need for collective
action. 0 9" However, they overlook the possibility that competition for
scarce resources may have taught minorities the opposite lesson-attending to one's own needs first.
Guinier and Torres. also place great faith in whites to rectify conditions in the minority community for fear that the same ills will
spread to the white community. 11 0 But this faith may be misplaced.
Poor voting conditions in minority neighborhoods in Florida"' did
not spread to other parts of the country; Scarsdale and Beverly Hills
went on voting with state-of-the-art machines. Indeed, the lost black
nonemergency medical care at public hospitals, as well as exclude them from social services such as disability insurance. Id. at 21.
101
Id. at 45-81.
102
See PEREA ET AL., supra note 6, at 1057-60, 1065 (reproducing portions of People ex
rel. Gallo v. Aeuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997)).
103
On the role of the Federalist Society in selecting conservative judges, see Amy
Bach, Movin' on Up with the Federalist Society, THE NATION, Oct. 1, 2001, at 11.
104
See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 20-21, 29, 54-55, 69-70, 96.
105
See YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at 19, 175; see also id. at 159 (reporting that Martin
Luther King, Jr. held out the same hope).
106
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
107
See Harris, supra note 86; supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
108
YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at 9, 16, 98-127.
109
GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 17, 28, 30, 81-88, 281.
110 See id. at 20-21.
111
On the Florida voting scandal in the last election, see Stacy Singer & John Maines,
Many Disqualified Votes in Minority Areas, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 2001, at 19.
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votes in Florida benefited the Republicans and their wealthy constituency.1 12 By the same token, whites have not rushed to tackle urban
ills. They simply have moved to the suburbs in a mass exodus known
as white flight.
Moreover, the best strategy for a sick canary may not be to form a
union with other birds, but to approach the mine owner and demand
measures that will improve safety for it alone, leaving the robins,
hawks, and blue jays to handle their own problems. Indeed, in most
eras, this is precisely what minorities have done. Blacks were, perhaps,
most successful in cutting deals with the white establishment, although Latinos attempted to follow suit for a time without notable
success. 1 3 And, some Asians have willingly accepted the role of
model minority. 1" 4 At one point, Guinier and Torres propose that
Latinos take on a middleman or intermediary role, halfway between
whites and blacks.1 5 But a people with roots in Chicano Power 11 6 and
Aztlan"1 7 would bridle at that suggestion. Most middleman groups
historically have served repressive functions. 18
To his credit, Yamamoto does not assign nonblack minorities to
demeaning roles. He does, however, commit the opposite error of
assuming that friction among outgroups can be surmounted merely
by dialogue. 1 9 Although he does include reparations for outgroups
that have oppressed one another, 120 he ignores that material and
structural conditions may make for an unproductive and strained dialogue. Moreover, he fails to account for the possibility of increased
intergroup hostility as old wounds are reopened and historical grievances are brought to the attention of a new generation.
With the two books and their basic themes in mind, it is time to
turn to their common thread-the search for interracial coalition.
SeeJohn Lantigua, How the GOP Gamed the System in Florida,THE NATION, Apr. 30,
112
2001, at 11.
113 On middle-of-the road Latino organizations that played the "other white" strategy,
see Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to Dismantle that Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 283, 302-03 (2000); see also infra Part III.E.2 (describing this strategy).
114
See Chang, supra note 95, at 1258-65.
GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 229.
115
116 See RODOLFo F. ACURA, ANYrHING BUT MEXICAN 21-22, 56, 262, 265 (1996); RoDOLFO ACU&qA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
OCCUPIED AMERICA].

See OCCUPIED AMERICA, supra note 116, at 390.
118 Cf Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructing the Violent
Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. Rv.15, 70-74, 101-07 (1993)
(arguing that Koreans who took a middleman approach were used as scapegoats following
the Los Angeles riots).
119 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
117
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II
THE ALGEBRA OF INTERRACIAL COALITION

Aside from successful instances, many coalitions endured only
until the dominant group offered a token concession; others turned
out to be based on a misunderstanding.12 1 Both books put forward a
number of examples of the former,1 22 which are carefully selected to
illustrate the authors' (usually optimistic) theses. Parts II and III of
this Review recount other examples of coalitions and analyze how
whiteness and white privilege shape coalition-building efforts.
Consider a hypothetical society containing three groups. Race
and color are not traits. Group A is the most numerous and powerful.
It comprises fifty percent of the population and, thus, has been able to
translate most of its wishes into law. It also controls well over fifty
percent of the country's wealth. Groups B and C each comprise
twenty-five percent of the population and command much less wealth
and political clout than the As.
Suppose that, at some point, groups B and C decide to form a
coalition to oppose the As, who run the country in ways that benefit
them and leave the Bs and Cs on the outside looking in. Because the
country is a democracy, a coalition of Bs and Cs would wield enough
voting power to enact measures and elect favorable officials.
Faced with this prospect, the As might rationally approach each
of their smaller adversaries separately and offer each a chance to
abandon the other group and join instead with the As. They might
point out that they are far richer and more numerous than either
competitor, so that a coalition with them will last forever. As an inducement to jump ship, the As offer the small group-say, the Csimmediate access to some of the wealth the more powerful As have
amassed over the years.
Group A will, of course, offer the same deal to group B. After all,
the Bs might be willing to join the As more cheaply than their counterparts. In effect, the As would force the weaker Bs and Cs to bid
against each other for solidarity with the dominant As. This bargaining would, presumably, drive down the price the As would have to pay
to protect their position.
121
See infra notes 130-31, 140-42, 150-86 and accompanying text (discussing drawbacks of coalitions).
122
E.g., GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 67-107 (describing multiracial campaign
leading to adoption of Texas 10 Percent Plan); id. at 131-38 (describing successful effort
to win worker concessions from K-Mart); YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at 52-59 (describing
successful campaigns for reparations and apologies); id. at 60-78 (setting out the roles of
Asian Americans and Native Americans in largely successful companies for healing and
reevaluation); id. at 254-75 (describing South Africans' search for reconciliation).
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Still, the As would have to pay something to induce one of the
two outsider groups to join them. Moreover, not only would the As
need to bribe one of the smaller groups to abandon principle, honor,
and the Three Musketeers creed, 1 23 they would also have to underwrite the price of assimilating the group into their more advanced
civilization. These costs might include teaching them the governing
language, offering them affirmative action in schools and jobs, and
other such costly programs.
The As, faced with the impairment of their formerly high standard of living, would look to the one remaining outsider group-the
one that did not join with it-for payment. Suppose B is the group
that jumped ship and joined with the As. The Cs are now greatly outnumbered and without allies, because their former friends, the Bs, are
now basking in the company of the powerful As.
The As now exact revenge on the Cs, extracting from them exactly what they had to pay the Bs, so that the As' standard of living
returns to its former level. What the Bs gain, the Cs lose. A's position
remains the same, B's is better, and C's is much worse. The Cs will
wish they had not broached the idea of coalition with the Bs in the
first place.
In the early years of the Critical Race Theory movement, Derrick
Bell propounded his interest-convergence theory of racial reform,
which holds that advances for blacks come only when they benefit
powerful whites as well. 124 The logic of coalition politics yields a corollary to Bell's dismal proposition: a minority group (like B in the
above example) will join with another in search for justice against the
majority (A) only when it is in the first group's interest to do so. Furthermore, such a group will abandon its ally in favor of the more powerful adversary as soon as the adversary offers concessions. The
minority group may even have entered into coalition with another
group precisely to gain the attention of powerful whites, always having
intended to jump ship when offered better terms.' 25
III
WE SHALL OVERCOME: WHEN THE

Is

BASIs

OF A COALITION

RACE

The analysis until this point has proceeded without consideration
of race. When A, B, and C are racial groups, little changes. Reflecting
on the role of whiteness and white privilege, and the record of past
123

"All for One, and One for All!" ALEXANDRE DUMAS, THE THREE MUSKETEERS 91

(Jacques Le Clerq trans., Modern Library, 1999).
124
See Bell, supra note 90, at 523.
125
Cf CRITIcAL WHITE STUDIES 251-335 (Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic eds., 1997)
(documenting white privilege and its enshrinement in cultural imagery).
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alliances among minority outgroups, shows that coalitions of color
are, if anything, more unstable than those based on class, union membership, or political affiliation.
A.

The Drawing Power of Whiteness

Not only are whites in this country the most numerous and powerful group-something that could easily change over time-they are
also normative, their ideas, hopes, values, holidays, heroes, traditions,
126
language, and narratives enshrined deeply in American culture.
American children's heroes, like Snow White, are Euro-American.
Language imagery associates whiteness with purity, innocence, and
virtue. 127 Think of our most sacred ceremonies: white is for weddings,
black for funerals. Even many minorities carry these associations and
attitudes in their heads. 128 Phrases like "sisterhood is powerful,"
"brown and black power," "power to the people," and others invoking
outgroup solidarity possess an undeniable appeal. But whiteness's rewards, which include acceptance, validation, power, and influence,
can plant a seed of doubt in the mind of any but the most dedicated
129
insurgent of color.
Consider, for example, how many once-radical 1960s leaders,
such as Corky Gonzalez, toned down their rhetoric and moderated
their demands once the white establishment offered them a Ford
Foundation or Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) grant to assume the role of community organizer, with patronage jobs to hand
30 Consider, as well, how militant black organizaout to their friends. 1
tions, like the Congress of Racial Equality, changed their agendas in
the direction of economic development when the same mainstream
funding organizations came calling. 13' Finally, recall how many law
students (and faculty members) of color enter law school with the intention of pursuing public interest careers, but, after three years in a
setting that holds up large-firm corporate practice as the pinnacle of

126

See id. at 251-88; PERFA ET AL., supra note 6, at 455-78.

127

See PEREA ET AL., supra note 6, at 464-78.

128 See id. at 464-78, 985 (discussing color imagery); Richard Delgado, Words that
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
133, 146-47 (1982); Laura M. Padilla, "But You're Not a Dirty Mexican": Internalized Oppression, Latinos & Law, 7 TEX. Hisp.J.L. & POL'V 59 (2001).
129
Cf PEREA Er AL., supra note 6, at 470 (reproducing a passage in Toni Morrison's The
Bluest Eye about the chagrin of a black character who realizes that she will never measure
up to white standards of beauty).
1-o See Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes-Interest
Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 377, 382-85 (2002).
13-;1 See id.
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professional success, nevertheless succumb to the lure of money and
prestige. 132
B.

Solidarity Problems-Defectors and the Paradox of
Leadership

Because of whiteness's attractiveness, a multiracial coalition is always susceptible to breakup if a subgroup leaves and makes common
cause with whites. Additionally, a similar dynamic could weaken a
steadfast group if individual members defect or if the leaders turn out
to be assimilated people who fail to appreciate the needs of their
group's most impoverished members.
1. Essentialism and the Problem of Internal Solidarity
Everyone knows of defector cases, like Richard Rodriguez or
Linda Chavez, the Latino/a writers who deplore affirmative action,
bilingual

education,

and

radical

Chicano

politics;

33

Clarence

Thomas, the African-American Supreme Court justice who almost always votes with the conservative majority; 134 and J.C. Watts, the black
Republican member of Congress who generally sided with his rightwing colleagues in restricting welfare, opposing election reform, supporting federalism, and criticizing liberal black leaders like Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton. a35 In California, a surprising number of voters
of color endorsed the anti-immigrant Proposition 187.1 36 Moreover,
English-only measures, anathema to most Latinos and Asians, draw
considerable support among African Americans, working-class whites,
137
and a few conservative Latinos.
It is true that the loss of some defectors will be offset by the occasional liberal white who joins. But the notion that two groups, which
between them total fifty percent of a country's population will, by virtue of that fact alone, be able to mount effective resistance is highly
problematic. Not only may another group in the coalition leave entirely, members in the group's own ranks may do so as well. It is essentialist to hope that every person of color will embrace radical politics
132
See ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT (Howard S. Erlanger ed., 1989);
Howard S. Erlanger et al., Law Student Idealism and Job Choice: Some New Data on an Old
Choice, 30 LAw & Soc'v REv. 851 (1996).
133

See RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD RODRI-

GUEZ (1982); Linda Chavez, Just Say Latino, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 22, 1993, at 18.
134
THOMAS

See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE
(1999); SAMUEL A. MARCOSSON, ORIGINAL SIN: CLARENCE THOMAS AND THE FAILURE

OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVES

(2000).

135 See Earl Ofari Hutchinson, A Black Republican Wises Up and Opts Out, L.A. TiMES, July
8, 2002, pt. 2, at 11.
136

See RICHARD DELGADO &JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION

72 (2001); YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at 26.
137 See Delgado, supra note 113, at 293, 295, 306.
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and mass action as a means of social reform. Some prefer individualism and personal initiative. Assuming that a group of color that numbers, say, thirty million members, will deliver that many votes for the
Democratic Party, affirmative action, and a host of familiar programs
may be a serious miscalculation.
2.

The Paradox of Representative Leadership

A related problem concerns the inevitable differences likely to
arise between the leaders of an outsider coalition and its rank and
file. 138 Especially in a large coalition, these differences are apt to pose
serious difficulties. The leaders are likely to be college educated, media-savvy individuals from urban backgrounds. Some of their constituents may be blue-collar or agricultural workers, single mothers, and
others with a host of immediate, day-to-day struggles and issues.' 3 9 If
the leaders are not attuned to these issues, the coalition will eventually
reach a crisis point.
Consider, for example, the campaign for black reparations, a
large national effort led by elites such as Harvard law professor
Charles Ogletree.1 40 The elite leadership, which includes many lawyers, has done valuable work in researching the history of black exploitation, calculating damages, and devising legal theories for
pursuing relief.' 4 1 Less impressive is their thinking regarding the
form that relief should take. One recurring suggestion is that the African-American community should receive amends in the form of college scholarships and other forms of affirmative action. 142
Nothing is wrong with affirmative action; I have written in support of it myself.' 4 3 Yet, as the exclusive or primary remedy for slavery
and racial oppression, it leaves much to be desired. It will certainly
benefit many upwardly mobile African Americans wishing to pursue
college or university studies. Yet, as everyone knows, just as many
young black men are in jail as are in college. 144 Why did the reparations committees not propose a bail fund for young blacks charged
138
School
139
140

See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471-72, 488-91 (1976).
See id. at 489-92.
For a report on the campaign and Professor Ogletree's role in it, see Charles J.

Ogletree, Jr., Litigating the Legacy of Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, at 9.
141
See Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REv. 597 (1993) (examining issues related to reparations to African Americans); Ogletree, supra note 140 (same).
142

See William Weir, Rally Supports Slavery Reparations, HARTFORD

COURANT,

June 20,

2002, at All.
14'
See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 CEO.
L.J. 1711, 1714 & n.7 (1995).
144
See Fox Butterfield, Study Finds Big Increase in Black Men as Inmates Since 1980, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2002, at A14.
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with or convicted of crimes? Such a remedy would be as beneficial as
college scholarships for those who are probably already on the path to
a successful life. Perhaps the reparations committee considered a bail
fund and decided that it was too controversial to win public support.
If so, they might have considered educational programs for prisoners,
halfway houses for the recently released, and anti-gang counseling
aimed at keeping unemployed, alienated youths out of prison in the
first place. My point is that these are remedies that would not occur
naturally to the movement's elite leadership because of structural reasons that are likely to plague any large coalition.
C.

Coalitions May Replicate Hierarchy

A further complication concerns the relationships that may develop within a coalition. Yen Le Espiritu has noted that one sort of
coalition-panethnic groups-are prone to a dynamic in which a
high-status, influential, and relatively assimilated group, such as the
Japanese in a pan-Asian movement, expects to assume a position of
power and authority.14 5 Meanwhile, less educated, poorer, or non-English-speaking members, such as Vietnamese or Cambodians, are left
feeling shortchanged and excluded. This practice not only adopts the
master's tools and thus unwittingly strengthens his house, but it also
weakens the coalition. During the Civil Rights era of the 1960s, recall
how women were asked to march in the back of protest parades (or in
front if the group expected violence), and to perform routine tasks
like making coffee at meetings. 146 Recall, as well, how Latinos and
Asians have often bowed out of local coalitions with African Americans when they expected their concerns to occupy center stage, and
how African Americans reacted negatively when the other groups
147
turned out to expect similar attention.
D.

Strange Bedfellows

The logic of a coalition may also require alignment with an ally
that is anathema to at least one of its members. Consider, for example, the suggestion of a speaker that Latinos and Asians concerned
about the militarized border and aggressive monitoring of immigrants
in the wake of September 11 make common cause with other groups
concerned with governmental surveillance. When she mentioned that
these might include anti-gun-control advocates, skinheads, and
145

See ESPIRITU, supra note 3, at 161-76.

For a discussion of the civil rights community's treatment of women, see BLACK
MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999). Yamamoto discusses similar treatment of black women by their white counterparts in feminist groups. See
YAMAMOTO, supra note 9, at 112.
147
See Megan Twohey, Role Reversal Jolts Blacks, Hispanics, 2001 NAT'LJ. 1122.
146
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survivalists, the Latinos and Asians in the room took the suggestion
seriously, while the blacks rolled their eyes.1 48 Libertarian anti-government activism is much less attractive to blacks than it is to other
groups of color, because blacks have found the federal government a
9
more steadfast champion than either state or private succor.14
E.

The Set Stage

Recent First Amendment theorists have written about the limitations of our system of free speech to deal with socially harmful
messages, such as hate speech. They have coined the term "empathic
fallacy" for the mistaken belief that a new, better narrative will always
prevail over an old, socially pernicious one.1 50 Coalition making
among outgroups confronts a similar obstacle. Coalition-making efforts never occur in the abstract. Instead, they take place on a set
stage replete with histories, grievances, and loyalties to third parties,
which may interfere with a coalition that, in the abstract, would appear to be in everyone's best interest.
1. Party Politics
Our political system contains two major parties, with rapidly diminishing differences between them. 15 1 Suppose that a powerful coalition of minorities is interested in promoting policy X. If Xis the kind
of policy that requires national action, only two avenues will be open
for effectuating it. The coalition must solicit support from either the
Republicans or the Democrats. If the coalition can interest neither,
the policy will arrive at a dead end.
2.

Material Factors

Latinos are notjust blacks with slightly lighter skins and a propensity for speaking Spanish. Nor are blacks just whites who happen not
to have any money right now. All groups of color exhibit different
148

Remarks at the Seventh Annual Conference of Latino Critical Studies (May 2-5,

2002).
149
See Anders Walker, Note, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399, 422-23
(1997).
150
See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1281 &
n.167 (1992).
The Democrats and the Republicans, for example, both support intervention in
151
Iraq, reductions in social welfare, and appointment of conservative or middle-of-the-road
judges. Bush and Gore: Issue by Issue, 32 NAT'L J. 3056 (Sept. 30, 2000); David Firestone,
DemocratsSeek Compromise with White House on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at Al 9; Robert
Pear, Senate Approves Sweeing Change in Welfare Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1996, at A].
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histories, cultures, identities, and needs. 5 2 Blacks tend to be urban
15 4
people, 153 whereas Mexican Americans are much more rural.
South Asian Indian immigrants often find work in the computer and
information science sector, 155 and so on.
Differences in the material situations of two groups interested in
coalition can easily lead to problems. Consider immigration policy,
for example. Relatively few blacks immigrate to the United States,
while many Latinos do. 156 Immigration, thus, is a major goal for Latinos. Likewise, one would expect blacks to be neutral or mildly positive toward immigration because it brings newcomers who are apt to
vote Democratic, favor affirmative action, and back workplace safety,
all measures of interest to blacks. Nevertheless, blacks as a group do
not support immigration because new arrivals would, in many cases,
compete with blacks for lower-echelon jobs. 1 57 Thus, differences in
the material circumstances of coalition partners can cause a coalition
to fail even on issues presenting no readily apparent disagreement between members of the coalition.
Consider a second way historical differences can cause problems.
Affirmative action is presently under siege, with conservative commentators and litigation centers calling for its repeal and even some of its
liberal supporters beginning to waver.' 58 One would think that a powerful coalition of minority groups, which now make up nearly onethird of the country's population,1 59 could offer serious resistance to
this movement. Neoconservatives, however, are now calling for a different strategy: cutting affirmative action back to its "traditional
core"-blacks.160 Some blacks have responded favorably, because
eliminating affirmative action for American Indians, Latinos, and
152
See supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining the term "differential
racialization").
See generally NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA (Lee A. Daniels
153
ed., 2002) (discussing issues confronting blacks, including the many troubles that blacks
face in inner cities).
154 On the role of immigration and labor law programs, such as the Bracero guestworker operations, in encouraging Mexican settlement in rural, agricultural regions, see,
for example, Ilan Stavans, Life in the Hyphen, in THE LATINo/A CONDITION 32, 34-35, 80-85
(Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic eds., 1998).
155
On the demography of Silicon Valley's workforce, see Tanai Khiaonarong, Leaping
into a High-Tech World, THE NATION, Feb. 26, 2002, at 3B.
156
See PEREA ET AL., supra note 6, at 18, 310-25.
157
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
158
See STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 100, at 45-81.
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Asian Americans would cost them nothing. 16 1 Perhaps a scaled-back
affirmative action program, limited to blacks, could be even more generous than the current one, featuring more slots, scholarships, and
special programs for blacks than the current version.
Any party to a coalition of color must realize the benefits of abandoning the coalition for one with whites. As noted earlier, such a coalition will be larger, more powerful, and potentially more durable
than one with another minority group. 16 2 Even when a coalition aims
to advance only a single issue that would benefit all of its members,
such as affirmative action, the coalition can still be destroyed if whites
offer a concession to one faction at the expense of the rest.
F.

The Law of Historical Grievance

The discussion to this point has shown that very few minority
groups pondering a coalition will come to the table on equal terms
and with a clean slate. They will not be similarly situated in every relevant respect; one group may have grievances with another group,
which, in turn, may have a grievance with the first. Groups lacking
any grievances with each other would hardly need a coalition. Being
similarly situated, they might as well work for common issues separately. Little is gained from coalition; working in concert may even
diminish efficiency, because it takes time to elect leaders and become
familiar with each other. Blacks might need to learn Spanish, while
Latinos might need to adjust to black ways of speaking, relating, and
doing business.
Assume, then, that we are considering a coalition between groups
where solidarity cannot be taken for granted. In our world, this situation is common: the dominant group frequently casts minorities
against one another in competition for scarce resources.1 63 For example, blacks may remember the time Latinos sacrificed black interests
and sought their own well-being first, whereas Latinos will remember
when blacks sided with white power or voted against a measure vital to
the Latino community. 164
Over time, the memory of a grievance is unlikely to fade. 16 5 The
group nursing the grievance will magnify it, recount it over and over,
and become more and more certain that it is important and in need
161

See id.

162 See supra notes 121-23, 126-32.
163 See Delgado, supra note 113, at 294-96.
164 See infra note 211 and accompanying text (giving, as examples, the recent mayoral
elections in Los Angeles and New York).
165 Recall how in Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia, Serbs, Turks, and Albanians endlessly relive the battle of Kosovo, fought in 1389. See Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco,
Eveyything You Ever Wanted to Know About Assimilation, but Were Afraid to Ask, DAEDALUS, Sept.
22, 2000, at 1.
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of redress. The other group, by contrast, will rationalize it. If the aggrieved group demands reparations or amends as a condition of coalition, the second group may respond with indignation or incredulity.
Consider, for example, the current debate over black reparations. 166 Blacks, who nurse grievances over slavery andJim Crow laws,
seek very large reparations from white society, believing that these historical atrocities are responsible for many, if not all, of the respects in
16 7
which blacks trail whites in achievement and standard of living.
Whites, by contrast, are apt to respond either petulantly or sorrowfully: Slavery took place a long time ago. The victims and perpetrators
are long since dead. If we make reparations for one group ....

Per-

68
haps it is time to move on.1
The law of historical grievances suggests that most coalitions will
never get off the ground. Any two potential partners will come together with at least one grievance that requires resolution. 69 The aggrieved party will set a very high price on settlement, while the other
party will consider the aggrieved to be unreasonable, petty, and vindictive. Even if the guilty party agrees that it should pay reparations to
the aggrieved party, it may lack the resources to do so. A third, even
more powerful, group may have bled it white, so that both the guilty
party and its historic victim are relatively impecunious.

G.

Alignment of Interest: The Predicate for Coalition

Coalition requires an alignment of interests-something that
brings two or more groups together. Guinier and Torres, however, do
not treat this alignment as problematic. If, on the morning of January
17, 2003, two groups, Latinos and.white women, are interested in the
same thing (for example, better working conditions in a
meat-packing plant), they are candidates for coalition.
Often, however, matters will be more complicated. Consider two
examples: the role of white women in the antebellum South and the
fate of black radicalism in the period leading up to the Civil Rights era
of the 1960s.

166
167

See DELGADO, supra note 160, at 162-83; Verdun, supra note 141.
See Verdun, supra note 141, at 639-41.
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ENQUIRER, Aug.
21, 2002, at 6C.
169 I.e., one that, if not resolved first, may cause trouble to break out later. See supra
notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
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White Women in Plantation Society

Just as plantation society treated black men as beasts,1 70 it placed
white women on a pedestal. The two are causally related, although
the connection rarely has been noted. 171 Consider white women's
role: trained in the domestic arts, from an early age white girls in plantation society were taught ladylike skills-piano playing, French, interior decorating, making small talk, and parrying the advances of the
well-born young men who would one day seek their hand in marriage.' 72 Ponder what such a young woman could not do: corseted,
dressed in finery, her hair elaborately coiffed, she could not play hard,
dig in the dirt, or go for a swim in the river, especially if it were located near the slave camp. She could not go for a long tramp in the
woods, learn to fix a plow, or ride a horse at breakneck speed through
the country.
She could not do any of these things, because Southern ladies
73
were expected to be the repositories of civilization and refinement.1
And they grew up saddled with these limitations precisely because
black men led the opposite life-brutalized, dirty, sweating, beaten,
174
and deprived of the opportunity to learn to read, paint, or write.
Because slave life was brutal and mean, white women, living in the big
house, were expected to personify the opposite values.
At the time, Southern women may have thought themselves fortunate. They were not required to work, develop their minds, or learn a
career. It was not until years later that feminist writers began to realize how limiting this conception of woman's ladylike role was and began to press for opportunities for women in the professions, politics,
education, and the arts.
In short, the institution of slavery oppressed both black slaves and
white women. Their oppression was inextricably linked, yet they were
not candidates for coalition politics in the ordinary sense. Yamamoto,
Guinier, and Torres find opportunities for joint action only when two
75
or more groups experience the very same form of mistreatment.
170
See PEREA ET AL., supra note 6, at 108-23; Judith Kelleher Schafer, "DetailsAre of a
Most Revolting Character":Cruelty to Slaves as Seen in Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
in SLAVERY AND THE LAW 241, 257 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997).
171
See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 136, at 5 (commenting on the connection
between analysis of women's roles and those of men of color); Tessie Liu, Teaching the
Differences Among Women from a HistoricalPerspective:Rethinking Race and Gender as Social Categories, 14 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 265, 270-74 (1991)

(implying a causal relationship be-

tween white women's and black men's roles in the old South).
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Avery eds., 1905); MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936).
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62 LA. L. REV. 509, 510 (2002).
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Slaves and white women, however, were not oppressed in the same
way-through unfair SAT requirements, for example, or low wages
from a meatpacking plant. Rather, their oppressions were complementary. Few women appreciated the link at the time. Although
some railed at their own bondage and fewer still at the crasser form of
bondage visited on the slaves, none seems to have seen her oppression
as intrinsically related to that of the slaves. 176 Slavery and women's
subjugation were separately unjust. Because the connections between
the two forms of injustice were indirect and veiled, the idea of coalition simply did not arise. Justice and injustice may be indivisible, but
if we rely, as most coalition theorists do, on the existence of a tangible
inequity visited on two groups by the same actor and in like fashion,
we shall miss opportunities to redress the linked underlying structures
that do the most damage.
2.

The Ending of the Civil Rights Era

As a second example of how difficult it can be to discern the
alignment of two groups' interests, consider the fate of the Civil
Rights movement of the 1960s. As Derrick Bell, and now Mary
Dudziak, have persuasively argued, Brown v. Board of Educationand the
softening of racial attitudes that it ushered in were attributable not so
much to moral breakthroughs on the part of whites, but rather to
changes in elite self-interest, which in turn were the result of Cold
177
War competition.
But what has only recently come to light is that many of the same
factors that brought about Brown, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and other
similar successes also account for the demise of that heady era a decade later. 178 By that time, the Civil Rights movement had taken a significant turn. At first prayerful, decorous, and nonviolent, the Civil
Rights movement changed its tenor with the appearance of Black
Power. 179 Panthers armed themselves, began quoting Mao, Marx, and
Lenin, and preached cultural nationalism and pride. 180 Malcolm X
wrote that whites were Satanic. 8 1 The white establishment responded
in two ways: with deadly force for the Panthers, and with grants and
jobs in the federal OEO program for other community leaders of
176
A few may have sympathized with the slaves, or wished themselves freer. But my
research has disclosed no female writer from this period who anticipated Tessie Liu's thesis. See supra note 171.
177
See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 250-51 (2002); Bell, supra note 90, at
524.
178
See Delgado, supra note 130, at 376-87.
179 See id. at 376-82.
180
See id. at 381.
181
See id. at 380.
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color who were willing to embrace a more conciliatory line. 8 2 Soon,
the movement changed direction. Economic empowerment succeeded confrontation and war protests. As it had done earlier with
figures like Paul Robeson, Geraldine Baker, and W.E.B. DuBois, the
mainstream black press condemned militant radicals who criticized
America, the idea of fighting in foreign wars, or capitalism. 83 And, as
had happened before, incipient black radicalism was placed on hold,
not to return again until a tamer version, Critical Race Theory, ap84
peared on the scene in the mid-1980s.'
Today, black fortunes are again languishing, with cutbacks in affirmative action, contractions in welfare, and increasing housing and
school segregation. 8 5 Yet, a generation of radical leaders that might
86
If commuhave given voice to the community's discontent is gone.'
nities of color in the 1970s had perceived their collective self-interest,
they might not have been so quick to reject their own indigenous radicalism in return for the helping hand of Ford Foundation dollars and
jobs in the federal antipoverty program.
The point of these examples is that although the imperative of
justice may be relatively clear at any moment in history, that of
self-interest may not be. Not only can coalitions be ungainly, ephemeral, and difficult to hold together, they may center around the wrong
measures entirely. If, as I believe, this difficulty inheres in coalition
politics, the arsenal of civil rights remedies must contain much more
than strategies that rely on collective action.
IV
RACIAL SOLIDARITY: THE HISTORICAL RECORD
As Parts II and III demonstrate, interminority solidarity faces formidable obstacles, both theoretical and actual. Yamamoto, as well as
Guinier and Torres, give these obstacles short shrift, barely mentioning a few in passing. 18 7 Moreover, the examples of successful coalition
that they do cite' 88 are rarely balanced with discussions of ones that
failed. The authors are, in short, selective and upbeat about the prospects of cooperation among minorities as a means of strengthening
182 See id. at 382-85.
183 See id. at 376-82.
184 See id. at 369-71.
185 See generally NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 153 (providing essays on the socioeconomic differences among African Americans, affirmative action, school choice, and housing issues within the African American community).
186 On the contemporary crisis in black leadership, see CORNEL WEST, RACE MATrERS
(1993).
187 See, e.g., GuINIER & TORRES, supra note 8, at 17, 79, 86-89, 101, 122; YxaAMOTO,
supra note 9, at 10-1l, 175-90.
188 See supra notes 21-26, 61-65 and accompanying text.
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democracy and promoting justice. Unfortunately, the historical record is more mixed than that. Missed opportunities for coalition are
as numerous as the successes.

A.

Outgroup Solidarity

Consider how, shortly after being released from slavery, blacks
joined the Buffalo Soldiers and helped put down Native-American rebellions. 1 9 The Native Americans, who might have expected solidarity with blacks, got trained killers instead. A few years later, middleclass Mexican Americans adopted the "other white" strategy as a way

of combating discrimination in housing, public accommodations, and
schools.' 9 0 Under this approach, Mexican community organizations
argued that discrimination against Mexicans in the United States is
illegal because Mexicans are white, and unlike with blacks, no state

statutes permitted discrimination against whites.' 91
In World War II, neither the NAACP nor any other major black
19 3
92
organization filed an amicus brief in Hirabayashi or Korematsu,
the two Supreme Court cases challenging the legality of Japanese internment1 9 4 No ethnic group of color has demonstrated conspicuous
solidarity with Muslims facing discrimination in the United States today.19 5 In California, Japanese parents objected to a San Francisco
school board policy of assigning their children to schools for Chinese
and Koreans. 196 Many years later, the Chinese successfully sued the
same board to set aside an admissions policy at elite Lowell High
School that favored the admission of African Americans and Latinos
and placed a ceiling on the admission of every group, including whites
97
and Asians.'

189
190
191

192
193
194

See Delgado, supra note 113, at 294.
See id. at 295-96, 303.
See id. at 296.
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
See Delgado, supra note 113, at 302. One might speculate that the organizations

took no position on the Japanese precisely because the black community hoped to reap
the rewards of patriotism and loyalty to America. See PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M.
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161-201 (1999) (pointing out that black fortunes often improve during wartime).
195 Cf Adam Cohen, Making Money Backwards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, Book Review
section, at 20 ("In the midst of a lengthy attack on racial profiling of blacks, [Johnnie
Cochran] volunteers that profiling on airlines, presumably of Middle-Easterners, is just
fine.").
196 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, California'sRacial History and Constitutional
Rationalesfor Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher Education, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1521,
1565 (2000); see also Delgado, supra note 113, at 295-96 (discussing similar lapses in minority solidarity).
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note 6, at 745; Delgado, supra note 113, at 303.
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Even within groups, we see breaches of coalition when the payoff
is high enough. In plantation society, the owner would frequently assign lighter-skinned slaves to desirable household work or jobs supervising the dark-skinned field hands. 198 The higher-status blacks were
expected to spy on their brothers and sisters and report any rumor of
rebellion or escape. 199 During World War II, many Japanese fought
gallantly in the U.S. Armed Forces at a time when their families were
languishing in concentration camps.2 0 In our time, law schools are
happy to assign charming associate and assistant deans of color the
tasks of dealing with student complaints, while major corporations frequently employ Asian or light-skinned, European-looking Latinos to
serve as personnel directors charged with laying off minority workers. 20 1 Who could successfully charge discrimination if the person
who fired you were a fellow person of color?
B.

White Solidarity

Although enduring coalitions among minority groups are rare,
the situation is different on the other side of the color line. White
subgroups often successfully ally with each other for various purposes,
which include putting down insurgent factions of color.
History recounts how Jews, Italians, and Irish arrived in large
numbers during the great wave of immigration that swept the country
in the early years of the twentieth century. 20 2 When they arrived, the
dominant Anglo-Saxons regarded them as nonwhite, even black. 20 3
Psychologists pronounced them inferior, even retarded. 20 4 Social and
settlement-house workers labored hard to induce them to give up
their inferior cuisine, language, and ways.2 0 5
Over time, these groups gained admission to the white race by
virtue of swearing loyalty to the Democratic Party, acquiring wealth,
sometimes by means of organized crime, and learning to discriminate
against the group at the real bottom of society-blacks.2 0 6 Although
the white coalition has changed its orientation in a few respects (a
majority of whites now belong to the Republican Party), it has never
wavered. No large group has ever abandoned it or sided decisively
198
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with people of color. During the Civil Rights revolution of the 1960s,
many young people, Jews, and some middle-aged white radicals supported black justice. 20 7 Today, that support has waned.208 Once an
immigrant group gains admission to the white race, membership, for
209
all intents and purposes, lasts forever.
Not only is the white coalition stable, it has managed to stave off
solidarity on the other side of the color line by designating small "pet"
groups of inoffensive minorities to control the other minority groups
and rebut any accusation that the dominant group is racist. 2 10 Minorities are not above succumbing to this strategy. Recall how in recent
mayoral elections in Los Angeles and New York, black loyalists readily
sided with old-time white pols who could be counted on (they
thought) to dispense patronage in predictable ways, and against up21 1
start Latino candidates who had a real chance at winning.
Blacks and whites do understand each other; they go back a long
21 2
way.
In some respects, they have more in common with each other
than they do with either Latinos or Asians because of those groups'
peculiar languages, cultural habits, and un-American ways. However,
whites and at least some Latinos do have one thing in common-skin
color. Light-skinned Latinos, as black (and white) commentators
have noted, experience little difficulty assimilating into the dominant
society, moving into white neighborhoods, and winning jobs in corporate hierarchies.2 1 3 Their rate of intermarriage is'
also higher than
that of African Americans. 214 Moreover, history is replete with examples of opportunistic coalitions between Latinos and Anglos. Early
on, Anglo setters were happy to marry Spanish, then Mexican, sefioritas in the Southwest in order to gain access to the woman's landholdings. 2 15 Later, many Mexican Americans served in the most
207 See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975) (describing the activists and
events leading up to the Civil Rights era).
208
On the decreasing public support for civil rights, see DELGADO, supra note 160, at
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209
That is, no group that has gained admission in this fashion seems to have been
expelled from the white race, much less voluntarily withdrawn from it.
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American of institutions-the U.S. Army-to demonstrate loyalty to a
216
country that had rejected them at every turn.
CONCLUSION: THE

ALTERNATIVE TO COALITION, JUSTICE

For the reasons mentioned, coalition among outgroups is unlikely to prove a very effective route to improvements in their social
condition. Coalition is likely to founder on cultural misunderstandings or historical grievances, and to encounter internal defections and
efforts by the dominant group to split the coalition.
Although it is true thatjustice includes a social dimension, it does
not follow that the best way to achieve justice is through a collective
approach. A collective approach may fail because of unarticulated differences in objective, motivation, or point of view. Collective action
may turn out to require enormous investments of energy in addressing grievances the parties have harbored against one another. They
may founder on the shoals of narratives, stock stories, and preconceptions about the other group or how the rapprochement should proceed. Solidarity may break down when one group abandons the
alliance in favor of a different group that has more to offer. Hierarchy of the very sort the coalition deplores may infiltrate the alliance,
with high status subgroups gravitating toward the most coveted jobs.
What avenue, then, is open to minority groups eager to claim a
fair share of society's bounty? Why not abandon coalition-a procedural device beset by a host of difficulties-and instead labor straightforwardly for social and material justice? This approach might
include, for example, Latinos organizing for bilingual education and
expanded immigration policies, blacks agitating against police profiling, and Native Americans fighting for sovereignty and self-rule. It
might include all these groups pressing, individually or collectively,
for retention of affirmative action in higher education.
In the movie The Untouchables, Robert DeNiro's character (Al
Capone) uses a baseball metaphor to explain his philosophy of teamwork. 2 17 Most of the time, he says, he is happy to be on a good team.
He depends on his teammates to do their jobs, especially when he
plays the field. But when he is batting, he relies on no one but himself. In similar fashion, today's outsider groups need to ponder what
tasks are best accomplished in concert with others, and which are better undertaken individually. For some projects, justice turns out to be
a solitary, though heroic, quest, and the road to justice is one that
must be traveled alone, or with our deepest, most trusted companions.
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